發問時間: 社會與文化語言 · 1 0 年前

請英文高手幫我翻譯成中文~謝謝

In a similar fashion, the extensive pursuit of strategic outsourcing though alliances can also exhibit diminishing returns on firm-level outcomes (Rothaermel, 2001).

Several theoretical arguments support this relationship . First, firms frequently compete for the most promising outsourcing options, and thus enter them first.

Based on the classical Ricardian rent model, this leaves only less productive alliance options as firms engage more intensively in strategic outsourcing.

Second, increasing reliance on strategic outsourcing implies that firms engage in multiple outsourcing agreements simultaneously at any given point in time, and thus managerial attention, frequently a constrained resource, may become overloaded and thus inadequate to oversee a firm’s alliance activities.

Increasing demands on managerial attention in turn accentuates the cognitive limitations of managers. Third, as firms enter an increasing number of outsourcing alliances, their commensurate transaction and bureaucratic costs increase, beyond a point where gains to additional alliances are outweighed by their marginal costs (Jones and Hill, 1988), thus producing diminishing returns.

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  • 宗啊
    Lv 4
    1 0 年前
    最佳解答

    用相似模式,雖然聯盟也能展覽減少的戰略性轉包業務的廣泛的追逐關於堅固水準的結果(Rothaermel,2001)回來。

    幾場理論的辯論支持這種關係。 首先,公司經常為最有前途把選擇轉給另一公司競爭, 因此首先進入他們。

    基于古典Ricardian租金模型,當公司在戰略性轉包業務過程中更強烈請時,這交給只不那么多產的聯盟選擇。

    其次,增加對戰略性轉包業務的倚賴暗示公司同時在任何規定的點及時從事多項轉包業務的協議, 因此經理注意,經常是強製的資源,變得可能超載,因此不適當監督活動聯盟firm s。

    在經理的注意上增加需求依次突出對經理的認識的限制。 第3, 因為公司進入越來越多轉包業務的聯盟, 他們的相當的交易和官僚政治費用增加, 在到另外的聯盟獲益的一個點以外按他們的邊際成本(瓊斯和小山,1988)超過,因此生產減少回來。

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