急急...請幫我翻譯這段(英-中) 謝謝

To be successful in international market by way of merger and acquisition synergies, DoCoMo should have been more serious about gaining management control. Although it accumulated direct or indirect shares in nine mobile operators during the telecom bubble period, it was the major player only in KPN Mobile in... 顯示更多 To be successful in international market by way of merger and acquisition synergies, DoCoMo should have been more serious about gaining management control. Although it accumulated direct or indirect shares in nine mobile operators during the telecom bubble period, it was the major player only in KPN Mobile in Netherlands and Hutchison in Hong Kong, which were minority geographic markets. The rest of the investments were not successful for being a market leader. AT&T Wireless was the No. 3 player in the U.S., KG Telecom was No.4 in Taiwan, and Hutchison was No. 5 in U.K. Since DoCoMo was the minority shareholder, it had very little or no management control. DoCoMo argued that the objective of global business expansion was to generate royalties from its i-mode business model for mobile Internet services in joint ventures with newly acquired partners and to increase the adoption of DoCoMo’s 3G mobile technology standard. In Japan, DoCoMo was able to dominate the entire value chain by specifying standards for handset manufacturers and regulating the content from content providers. Did it evaluate all the success factors for its i-mode service in Japan before expanding to overseas markets?
Was the U.S. Ready for i-mode?
At the time of the acquisition of AT&T, Japan and Europe had already begun migrating to the 3G networks whereas in the U.S. there were many full second-generation network coverage and some 2.5G providers. Although the limited 2.5G data transmission speed did not support advanced multimedia services, it provided the basis content that satisfied customers. This was, however, not sufficient to be marketed as i-mode under DoCoMo’s standards.
4 個解答 4