發問時間: 社會與文化語言 · 1 0 年前

保險方向的翻譯問題,問題主要是出在第二段,翻完還是看不太懂也

Managers of insurers are assumed to be risk-averse utility maximizers. To the extent that their interests are aligned with those of owners, because of incentive compensation schemes and other disciplinary mechanisms, the authors expect the managers to pursue the owners' goal of maximizing firm value. However, in circumstances in which owners have relatively weak ability to control managers, managers may pursue an objective of maximizing their own expected utility even though doing so may be a deadweight cost to firm value.

This may be especially likely for insurers that are organized as mutuals, because the mutual ownership form provides relatively limited mechanisms for owners to control managers. Thus, mutual managers may tend to place a high priority on avoiding or hedging risks that threaten their job security and fail to invest in some positive net present value projects that would increase firm value but are relatively risky.(FN20) This argument also predicts that because mutual managers are more concerned about hedging risk, they will be more likely to use derivatives than managers of comparable stock insurers.

保險公司經理被假定為是風險厭惡效用最大者。只要他們的利益與業主一致,因為激勵薪酬計劃和其他懲戒機制,作者期望管理者追求業主公司價值最大化的目標。然而,在何種情況下業主能力相對薄弱來控制經理人,經理人可能追求自己預期效用最大的目標,即使這樣做以公司的價值可能是一個無謂的成本,。

這可能是保險公司是有組織的,相互的,因為共同業主的型式相互提供相對有限的機制業主控制經理人。因此,相互經理人可能會高度重視避免或規避風險,威脅到他們的工作安全和失敗的投資中有一些正的淨現值項目將增加公司價值,但相對的風險。 ( FN20 )這一論點還預測,因為相互管理者更為關心的是規避風險,他們將更有可能使用衍生性商品比可比股票保險公司經理人。

1 個解答

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  • John
    Lv 6
    1 0 年前
    最佳解答

    Managers of insurers are assumed to be risk-averse utility maximizers. To the extent that their interests are aligned with those of owners, because of incentive compensation schemes and other disciplinary mechanisms, the authors expect the managers to pursue the owners' goal of maximizing firm value. However, in circumstances in which owners have relatively weak ability to control managers, managers may pursue an objective of maximizing their own expected utility

    even though doing so may be a deadweight cost to firm value.

    保險公司經理人,理所當然地被視為風險規避之效能最大化者,對於這樣的廣度,因為獎勵的酬薪方案及其他懲戒機制,他們的利益會與保險公司結合在一起。作者們預期,經理人會追求公司價值最大化的保險公司目標。然而,在此情況下,保險公司對於控制經理人,在能力上相對性地薄弱,經理人可能追求他們自己最大化預期效能目標,雖然如此做,對公司的價值來說,可能是一無謂成本。

    This may be especially likely for insurers that are organized as mutuals, because the mutual ownership form provides relatively limited mechanisms for owners to control managers. Thus, mutual managers may tend to place a high priority on avoiding or hedging risks that threaten their job security and fail to invest in some positive net present value projects that would increase firm value but are relatively risky.(FN20) This argument also predicts that because mutual managers are more concerned about hedging risk, they will be more likely to use derivatives than managers of

    comparable stock insurer s.

    對於保險公司,這彼此組織結合或許有其可能,因為彼此之所有形式,對於保險公司控制經理人上,提供了相對性地限制機制。因此,相互間之經理人,在避免或隔離威脅他們工作保障風險上,可能傾向將其置於高度優先,並且缺乏投注心力於一些正淨現值的專案上,雖然如此必為提高公司價值,但相對地具有風險(FN20)。此一論點也預測,因為相互間之經理人對於隔離風險更加憂慮,比起相對比之股票保險公司的經理人,他們將更有可能從事衍生行商品。

    參考資料: myself
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