The risk of an inadequate replacement rate is much greater in the case of low-income workers. This is amply shown by experience in Chile, where the proportion of members contributing regularly to the fund is 45-55 per cent in funds catering to lower-paid workers, compared with 80-90 per cent for those with better paid members. Furthermore, charges and commissions tend to weigh much more heavily on the low-paid, as they often include a flat-rate element or minimum amount. The risk of ending up with a very low pension affects not just poor workers themselves but also the state, which may well have to provide social assistance for many of them in their old age.
It has recently been argued by certain economists in Latin America that a fundamental weakness of the Chilean pension system is the fact that the state provides a minimum pension guarantee. Their view is that low-paid workers in precarious jobs prefer to avoid contributing to their mandatory savings account and to rely on the state guarantee instead-particularly as the personal pension they earn may end up being very low in any case. Certainly the high incidence of non-compliance among the low-paid workers are thereby behaving in an economically rational manner or simply adopting a very short time horizon. What are the policy implications of this argument?
Its proponents may say that the state should provide no guarantee or make it very unattractive through the imposition of stricter conditions. The more socially minded, however, may conclude that the social security system should be redesigned to ensure a much better rate of compliance.
- DonnyLv 71 0 年前最佳解答
在低收入勞工的案例當中不充足更換率的風險是更加龐大。智利的經驗充分顯示，與80-90% 收入較好的成員比較，定期捐助基金的成員比例是45-55%，以專款方式照顧到低收入勞工。 而且，費用和傭金傾向於對低收入者更加沉重地權衡，因為他們通常包括單一的費率或最小的額度。 以極低的退休金對結束風險產生作用不只是貧窮勞工自己也可能是必須在晚年提供社會救助給很多人的國家。
最近拉丁美洲某些經濟學者對智利退休金制度的基本弱點是國家提供了一個最小的退休金保障的事實有所爭議。 他們認為是工作不穩定的低收入勞工喜歡逃避捐款到他們的強制性儲蓄帳戶，而以依賴國家保證代替-尤其在他們所賺的個人退休金可能在任何情況下被極低終止。 當然不符合低收入勞工的高發生率從此以經濟合理的作法行動或僅僅採用極短時間的範圍。 此爭議的政策含義是什麼？