1. Try to elaborate the argument that appeals to the possibility of a Cartesian evil genius for the thesis that whenever we seem to perceive or experience material objects or situations, what we are experiencing most directly is subjective sensations in our minds. How compelling is this argument? 2. The crucial premise of the second stage of the argument from illusion is the claim that in a continuous range of perceptual cases, the shift from immediately perceiving subjective sensations (sense-data or adverbial qualities) to immediately perceiving a material object or situation should make some discernible difference in the perceptual experience itself. How plausible is this premise? Can you see any way to argue for (or against) it?3. Consider a case of perception in which at least some of the immediately experienced qualities are not (from a common sense standpoint) qualities that the material object in question actually has: for example, the table is actually rectangular, but the immediately experienced shape is trapezoidal. Might it still be that in such a case we are still immediately perceiving the material object itself (and not a subjective sensation or sense-datum)? Is it enough to say merely that the table itself looks trapezoidal even though it is not?4. Choosing an example of your own, try to specify as fully as you can a phenomenalist account of what it is for a certain specific object to exist in a certain specific location. This means specifying what sequences of sense data would need to be experienced to establish that you are in the right location and then what further sense data would need to be experienced to establish the existence there of that particular sort of object. What sorts of problems arise in doing this? Do these show that phenomenalism is an untenable position? 出處:http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~adali/ref.htm
5.Does an explanation of sensory experience like Berkeley’s (or those appealing to the Cartesian evil genius or the brain-in-a-vat situation) always require the use by God (or whatever other being or mechanism generates the experience)
(接上題)of a conception or model of a material world in order to yield results that are (a) specific and detailed and (b) in conformity with the kinds of experience that we actually have? Or is there some alternative basis upon which the specific sensory results might be determined?
- 阿昌Lv 79 年前最佳解答