景涵 發問時間: 社會與文化語言 · 8 年前

哲學題目 英翻中

這是報告的題目,實在看不懂=_=

希望能有中文翻譯

因為報告可用中文作答,所以只需把題目翻成中文就行了,感謝!!

ps.勿用翻譯機

1. Try to elaborate the argument that appeals to the possibility of a Cartesian evil genius for the thesis that whenever we seem to perceive or experience material objects or situations, what we are experiencing most directly is subjective sensations in our minds. How compelling is this argument? 2. The crucial premise of the second stage of the argument from illusion is the claim that in a continuous range of perceptual cases, the shift from immediately perceiving subjective sensations (sense-data or adverbial qualities) to immediately perceiving a material object or situation should make some discernible difference in the perceptual experience itself. How plausible is this premise? Can you see any way to argue for (or against) it?3. Consider a case of perception in which at least some of the immediately experienced qualities are not (from a common sense standpoint) qualities that the material object in question actually has: for example, the table is actually rectangular, but the immediately experienced shape is trapezoidal. Might it still be that in such a case we are still immediately perceiving the material object itself (and not a subjective sensation or sense-datum)? Is it enough to say merely that the table itself looks trapezoidal even though it is not?4. Choosing an example of your own, try to specify as fully as you can a phenomenalist account of what it is for a certain specific object to exist in a certain specific location. This means specifying what sequences of sense data would need to be experienced to establish that you are in the right location and then what further sense data would need to be experienced to establish the existence there of that particular sort of object. What sorts of problems arise in doing this? Do these show that phenomenalism is an untenable position? 出處:http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~adali/ref.htm

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要翻成通順可以理解的句子喔~謝謝!

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5.Does an explanation of sensory experience like Berkeley’s (or those appealing to the Cartesian evil genius or the brain-in-a-vat situation) always require the use by God (or whatever other being or mechanism generates the experience)

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(接上題)of a conception or model of a material world in order to yield results that are (a) specific and detailed and (b) in conformity with the kinds of experience that we actually have? Or is there some alternative basis upon which the specific sensory results might be determined?

1 個解答

評分
  • 阿昌
    Lv 7
    8 年前
    最佳解答

    1試著來闡述論點,呼籲笛卡爾邪惡的天才的論斷的可能性時,我們似乎感知或經驗材料對象或情況,我們正在經歷的最直接的是我們頭腦中的主觀感覺。引人注目的是這種說法如何?

    2從幻想的論點的第二階段的關鍵前提是,在一個感性的情況下連續範圍,立即感知的物質對象或情況,應立即感知的主觀感覺(檢測數據或狀語素質)轉變一些索賠在感性經驗本身的明顯差別。此前提下如何合理的?你能看到任何方式來爭取(或反對)嗎?

    3考慮了知覺的情況下,其中至少有一些立刻感受到素質不從常識的角度來看,實際上有問題的材料對象的素質:例如,表實際上是長方形的,但立即有經驗的形狀是梯形。它仍然可能是,在這種情況下,我們還是立即察覺的物質對象本身(而不是一個主觀感覺或感覺材料)?是否足以說只是表本身看起來梯形的,即使它是不是?

    4選擇你自己的一個例子,充分的現象論的帳戶,它是某一個特定的對象存在於某一特定位置,你可以嘗試指定。這意味著指定的檢測數據序列將需要經驗,以建立您在正確的位置,然後將需要有經驗的,以確定該對象的特定排序的存在有什麼進一步的檢測數據。在這個過程中出現什麼樣的問題?這些表明,現象論是站不住腳的立場?

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